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The sustainability of fiscal deficits has been receiving increasing attention. The issue is
paramount for the newly formed euro area and this is one of the motivations of this paper.
In order to assess the sustainability of budget deficits, co-integration tests between public
expenditures and public revenues, allowing for structural breaks, are performed for the
EU countries for the 1970-2003 period. The “unpleasant” empirical results show that with
few exceptions fiscal policy may not have been sustainable. EU governments therefore
could risk becoming inherently highly indebted, even if the debt-to-GDP ratios seemed to
be somehow stabilising at the end of the 1990s. (JEL: H62, H63)
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1. Introduction
In the last two decades several developed countries have experienced significant budget
deficits, while the ability of government to cope with fiscal deficits has been receiving
increasing attention from economists. This is an important topic both in terms of
economics and public policy. The issue is paramount for the newly formed euro area and
this is one of the motivations of this paper. Theoretically, equilibrium growth paths need
to be supported by adequate fiscal policy.
Furthermore, the Treaties governing the European Union impose the practical necessity
of sustainable public accounts. It is possible to assess sustainable public finances in terms
of compliance with the budgetary requirements of the European Monetary Union, i.e.
avoiding excessive deficits, keeping debt levels below the 60 percent of GDP reference
value, and respecting the “close to balance or in surplus” requirement of the Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP). From a forward-looking perspective, one may also notice that the
SGP imposes commitments on Member States for budgetary positions in the medium-
term (three to five years) and does not require explicit longer-term targets. Therefore,
sustainability is de facto ensured provided budget balances respect the “close to balance
or in surplus” target.
Quite a few studies have already addressed the issue of fiscal policy sustainability and
provided empirical testing of the Present Value Borrowing Constraint (PVBC)
1. The
main analytical apparatus used to analyse the sustainability of budget deficits are
stationarity tests for the stock of public debt and co-integration tests between government
expenditures and government revenues. This paper adds to the existing literature by
applying unit root and co-integration tests to the EU-15 countries over the period 1970-
2003, using consistent public finance data from one single source, the European
Commission AMECO database. It also tests for the existence of structural breaks during
the time sample in each country. The selected time span includes therefore the run up to
                                                          
1 Examples of such a growing literature include, for instance, Hamilton and Flavin (1986), Trehan and
Walsh (1988, 1991), Kremers (1988, 1989), Wilcox (1989), Hakkio and Rush (1991), Tanner and Liu
(1994), Quintos (1995), Haug (1991, 1995), Ahmed and Rogers (1995), Payne (1997), Artis and Marcelino
(1998), Bohn (1998), Fève and Hénin (2000), Uctum and Wickens (2000), and Bravo and Silvestre (2002).3
the introduction of the euro and the efforts, made during the 1990s, by several countries
to streamline their public accounts in order to join the common currency. Additionally,
both the theoretical and analytical procedures used to assess fiscal sustainability are
briefly restated.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the issue of sustainability.
Section three briefly reviews the analytical framework under which one usually assesses
the sustainability of public deficits. Section four presents some stylised facts of fiscal
policy for the EU countries. It also reports and discusses the results of the empirical
analysis, comprising both stationarity tests and co-integration tests between government
expenditures and government revenues for the EU-15 countries, allowing for structural
breaks in the series or in the co-integration relationship. Finally, section five provides a
conclusion.
2. The issue of sustainability
Fiscal sustainability seems a recurrent topic that both individual countries and
international organisations dwell upon with some regularity
2. At the beginning of the
1920s, when writing about the public debt problem faced by France, Keynes (1923, p. 24)
mentioned the need for the French government to conduct a sustainable fiscal policy in
order to satisfy its budget constraint. Keynes stated that the absence of sustainability
would be evident when “the State's contractual liabilities (…) have reached an excessive
proportion of the national income.” In modern terms, sustainability is challenged when
the debt-to-GDP ratio reaches an excessive value. There is a problem of sustainability
when the government revenues are not enough to keep on financing the costs associated
with the new issuance of public debt.
The sustainability of fiscal policy is sometimes associated with the financial solvency of
the government. In practice however, what the empirical literature ends up testing is
whether both public expenditures and government revenues may continue to display in
the future their historical growth patterns. If a given fiscal policy turns out to be
                                                          
2 See for instance Chalk and Hemming (2000).4
unsustainable, it has to change in order to guarantee that the future primary balances are
consistent with the budget constraint
3. Theoretically any value for the budget deficit
would be possible if the government could raise its liabilities without limit. Obviously,
that is impossible since the government is faced with the present value of its own budget
constraint. 
It also is worthwhile noticing that the hypothesis of fiscal policy sustainability is related
to the condition that the trajectory of the main macroeconomic variables is not affected
by the choice between the issuance of public debt or the increase in taxation. Under such
conditions, it would therefore be irrelevant how the deficits are financed, implying also
the assumption of the Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis. 
The government budget constraint is the starting point to derive the present value of the
budget constraint. The flow budget constraint is written as 
t t t t t B R B r G     1 ) 1 (, ( 1 )
where  G is the government expenditures, excluding interest payments, R is the
government revenues, B is the public debt and r is the real interest rate
4. Rewriting
equation (1) for the subsequent periods, and recursively solving that equation leads to the
































B .( 2 )
                                                          
3 Cuddington (1997) and Hénin (1997) discuss this topic. Blanchard et al. (1990) present as a definition of
sustainable fiscal policy one that allows, in the short-term, that the debt-to-GDP ratio returns to its original
level after some excessive variation.
4 Sometimes in the literature, for the validation of theoretical results, the real interest rate is assumed
stationary, but this is a much more difficult assumption for the nominal interest rate.5
When the second term from the right-hand side of equation (2) is zero, the present value
of the existing stock of public debt will be identical to the present value of future primary
surpluses. However, equation (2) is not appropriate for empirical testing. It is therefore
useful to make several algebraic modifications to equation (1). Assuming that the real
interest rate is stationary, with mean r, and defining
1 ) (     t t t t B r r G E ,( 3 )
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A sustainable fiscal policy should ensure that the present value of the stock of public
debt, the second term of the right hand side of (4), goes to zero in infinity, constraining
the debt to grow no faster than the real interest rate. In other words, it implies imposing
the absence of Ponzi games and the fulfilment of the intertemporal budget constraint.
Faced with this transversality condition, the government will have to achieve future
primary surpluses whose present value adds up to the current value of the stock of public
debt. Put another way, public debt in real terms cannot increase indefinitely at a growth
rate beyond the real interest rate
5. 
It is also possible to derive the solvency condition, with all the variables defined as a
percentage of GDP
6. The PVBC, with the variables expressed as ratios of GDP, with y
being the GDP real growth rate, and neglecting for presentation purposes seigniorage
revenues, is then written as 
                                                          
5 See Joines (1991). McCallum (1984) discusses if this is a necessary condition to obtain an optimal growth
trajectory for the stock of public debt.
6 For instance Hakkio and Rush (1991, p. 430) support that an analysis based on ratios is more appropriated
for growing economies: “in addition to examining revenue and spending directly, we also use [to]
normalize these variables using real GNP and population. This is an important extension beyond previous
work since McCallum [1984], among others, deems these ratios - per capita spending and revenue, and
































Assuming the real interest rate to be stationary, with mean r, and considering also
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with bt = Bt/Yt, et = Et/Yt and t = Rt/Yt. When r > y, it is necessary to introduce a





















, in order to bound public debt
growth
7. This yields the familiar result that fiscal policy will be sustainable if the present
value of the future stream of primary surpluses, as a percentage of GDP, matches the
“inherited” stock of government debt
8.
3. Assessment of the sustainability of public deficits
A common practice in the literature, among the set of methods to evaluate fiscal policy
sustainability, is to investigate past fiscal data to see if government debt follows a
stationary process or to establish if there is co-integration between government revenues
and government expenditures
9. 
Recalling the PVBC, equation (4), it is possible to present analytically two
complementary definitions of sustainability that set the background for empirical testing:
i) The value of public current debt must be equal to the sum of future primary surpluses:
                                                          
7  This implies that the growth rate of the debt-to-GDP ratio should be less than the factor
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s r y .
8 According to Buiter (2002), the intertemporal government budget constraint should be satisfied always
and not only in equilibrium. This is Buiter's main criticism of the fiscal theory of price level.
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In order to test empirically the absence of Ponzi games, one can test the stationarity of the
first difference of the stock of public debt, using unit root tests developed by Dickey and
Fuller (1981) and by Phillips and Perron (1988). 
It is also possible to assess fiscal policy sustainability through co-integration tests. The
implicit hypothesis concerning the real interest rate, with mean r, is also stationarity.
Using again the auxiliary variable  1 ) (     t t t t B r r G E , and the additional definition
1    t t t t B r G GG , the intertemporal budget constraint may also be written as  
1
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and with the no-Ponzi game condition, GGt and Rt must be co-integrated variables of
order one for their first differences to be stationary.
Assuming that R and E are non-stationary variables, and that the first differences are
stationary variables, this implies that the series R and E in levels are I (1). Then, for
equation (9) to hold, its left-hand side will also have to be also stationary. If it is possible
to conclude that GG and R are integrated of order 1, these two variables should be co-
integrated with co-integration vector (1, -1), for the left-hand side of equation (9) to be
stationary.8
Therefore the procedure to assess the sustainability of the intertemporal government
budget constraint involves testing the following co-integration regression:
t t t u bGG a R    . If the null of no co-integration, the hypothesis that the two I (1)
variables are not co-integrated, is rejected (with a high-test statistic), this implies that one
should accept the alternative hypothesis of co-integration. For that result to hold true, the
series of the residual ut must be stationary, and should not display a unit root.
 Several
conclusions concerning the intertemporal budget constraint may then be established: 
i) When there is no co-integration, the fiscal deficit is not sustainable,
ii) When there is co-integration with b=1, the deficit is sustainable,
iii) When there is co-integration, with b < 1, government expenditures grow faster than
government revenues, and the deficit may not be sustainable
10.
Hakkio and Rush (1991) also demonstrate that if GG and R are non-stationary variables
in levels, the condition 0 < b < 1 is a sufficient condition for the budget constraint to be
obeyed. However, when revenues and expenditures are expressed as a percentage of GDP
or in per capita terms, it is necessary to have b = 1 in order for the trajectory of the debt
to GDP not to diverge in an infinite horizon
11. The procedure to test the sustainability of
fiscal policy may be summarised, in a graphical sequential overview, by Figure 1.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
 
Before proceeding it seems adequate to close the present section by summarising the
empirical findings of several previous studies, concerning the issue of sustainability.
Therefore, Table 1 reviews the conclusions of those papers, which cover basically the US
and European countries, with sometimes quite conflicting results.
                                                          
10 Concerning this co-integration analysis approach Bohn (1991, 1995) argues that a sustainable fiscal
policy in a certain environment may become unsustainable under uncertainty.
11 Quintos (1995), Ahmed and Rogers (1995) and Bergman (2001) discuss the necessary conditions for
sustainability in terms of the order of integration of public debt.9
[Insert Table 1 about here]
4. Fiscal policy sustainability in the EU-15 area
This section includes some stylised facts on fiscal policy during the 1970-2003 period for
the EU-15 countries. It also reports the unit root tests and estimation results of co-
integrating relations between expenditures and revenues.
4.1. Some stylised facts
A brief characterisation of the debt and fiscal burden for the EU countries is appropriate
before performing the empirical testing of the sustainability hypothesis. Between the
beginning of the 1970s and the end of the 1990s the debt-to-GDP ratio exhibited an
increasing trend for most countries throughout the period. For instance, general
government debt increased in Italy from 37.9 percent of GDP in 1970, to 110.6 percent of
GDP in 2000. In Germany the debt-to-GDP ratio was 18.2 percent in 1970 and went
beyond the 60 per cent level in 1997. According to European Commission data, in 2003
three countries still had a debt-to-GDP ratio above 100 percent (Italy, Belgium and
Greece), while in three other countries the debt ratio was higher than 60 percent (Austria,
Germany and France).
In the period 1970-2003 the highest debt-to-GDP ratios were reported in Italy and
Belgium (the country with the highest debt-to-GDP ratio in that period; reaching 138.2
percent in 1993), and their high debt service payments induced substantial budget deficits
despite primary budget surpluses. A reversal of that general trend is noticeable only at the
end of the 1990s, as the several “more indebted” countries tried to fulfil or at least come
closer to the Maastricht debt criterion.
The consequences of choosing different fiscal policies may be exemplified by looking for
instance at the public debt paths of some of the EU countries, as depicted in Figure 2. For
instance, the adding up of successive and significant budget deficits in Italy and in
Belgium had a clearly identifiable impact on government debt, with the debt-to-GDP10
ratio rising steadily until the middle of the 1990s. Germany and France also exhibited a
slowly growing debt ratio throughout the 1980s and 1990s. On the other hand, debt ratio
at the UK followed a downward path, while Ireland changed from being a high debt
country in the 1980s to a “less indebted” country in the 1990s.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Concerning government expenditures and revenues, Table 2 reports those items as a
percentage of GDP for each country. The main conclusion is that the burden of public
expenditures and revenues on GDP has increased since the 1970s in almost every
country. Another obvious fact is that, , between 1970 and 2003, the ratio of government
expenditures to GDP, for most countries, exhibited a higher growth rate than the ratio of
government revenues to GDP. This conclusion holds for all countries except for Belgium,
Ireland and Italy. For instance in Italy, the ratios of government revenues and
expenditures to GDP were respectively 29 and 32.6 percent in 1970, compared with 45.9
and 48.5 percent in 2003.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
4.2. Estimation results for the debt series
The focus of this sub-section and the next, is the study of fiscal policy sustainability for
each of the EU-15 countries. Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP)
tests are used in an attempt to validate the sufficient sustainability condition, using the
stock of real public debt. Table 3 reports the stationarity tests results for the first
difference of the stock of public debt, at 1995 prices, for the period 1970-2003 (see data
sources in the Annex), considering both a constant and no trend.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
The results allow the rejection of the null of a unit root for Austria, Portugal and the UK,
according to ADF tests, and for France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg,11
Portugal, Spain and Sweden, using the PP tests. Therefore the series of the first difference
of public debt might be I (0) for some countries, and the solvency condition would be
satisfied in those cases. However, if one considers also a time trend, then neither the ADF
nor the PP tests report that any of the series is I (0). 
The previous results assume that there is no structural break in the debt series. However,
this might not be the case in some countries, namely for Germany due to reunification in
1990.
12 In the presence of structural changes in the trend function, ADF and PP tests that
do not take account of the break in the series have low power and are biased toward the
non-rejection of a unit root. One procedure to test for unit roots in the presence of a
structural break involves splitting the sample into two parts and using the unit root tests
for each part. However, a resulting problem is that the degrees of freedom are diminished
for each of the parts. 
Therefore, following Zivot and Andrews’ (1992) recursive approach, we tested the null
hypothesis that the series have a unit root against the alternative of stationarity with
structural change at some unknown break date denoted by TB.
13 The break date is chosen
endogenously as the value, over all possible break points,
14 which minimises the t-
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The shift in the trend is given by DTt = t-TB, if t > TB, and 0 otherwise, and the shift in the
mean by DUt=1 if t > TB, and 0 otherwise. TB equals one at the observation after the
break point, while the additional one-time dummy D(TB)t=1 if t=TB+1 and 0 otherwise.
This “innovational outlier” model specifies that the change to the new trend function is
gradual. Table 4 reports the ADF test statistics proposed by both Zivot and Andrews
                                                          
12 For instance, Greiner and Semmler (1999) report a break date for Germany in 1990, while Getzner et al.
(2001) mention a break date in 1975 for Austria (but with a longer historical dataset).
13 This is a variation of the test of Perron (1988), with the advantage that the break point is estimated rather
than fixed exogenously. See, for instance, Hansen (2001) for a review of these issues.
14 Zivot and Andrews (1992) suggest estimating the autoregressions in some interval that excludes break
dates near the beginning or the end of the sample.12
(1992) and by Perron (1994) for the best-fitted regression, alongside the estimated break
dates.
15
[Insert Table 4 about here]
The results allow for the rejection of the unit root hypothesis for Austria, Finland and the
UK, using the Zivot and Andrews test statistic, for Finland, Germany, Sweden and the
UK when the Perron test statistic is used. However, in general one cannot reject the unit-
root null at the 5 percent or 10 percent level, implying that there is not much evidence
against the unit-root hypothesis for most of the debt series in the EU-15 countries. These
results are, to some extent, in line with the standard unit-root tests reported previously in
Table 3.
Since some debt series might be stationary with breaks, the selected value of TB is a
consistent estimate of the break point. Interestingly, most of the reported breaks seem to
cluster in the 1990s, and more specifically in the first half of the decade, namely Austria
in 1991/92, Finland in 1990/91, and Germany in 1993/94. One can also notice that, for
instance, in Finland the debt-to-GDP ratio increased by more than threefold between
1990 and 1992 (while there was a severe recession in 1991/92). On the other hand, the
estimated break date for Germany occurs only in 1993.
One should also notice that the number of observations used is only 33 at most, and the
accuracy problems of unit root tests with small samples are well known. However, the
alternative approach of using quarterly data would constrain the time period, so that it is
therefore preferable to use a longer sample of annual data, instead of more observations
along a smaller time span. Furthermore, the rejection of the stationarity hypothesis does
not mean, as already noticed above, that public accounts are not sustainable, since as
Trehan and Walsh (1991) observe, the stationarity of the variation of the stock of public
debt is a sufficient condition, and stationarity rejection does not necessarily imply the
absence of sustainability in the government accounts.
                                                          
15 The statistical algorithm used to compute these test statistics, following the sequential method proposed
by Zivot and Andrews, was implemented with a TSP programme, available at
http://www.stanford.edu/~clint/tspex/.13
4.3. Co-integration results
We now proceed to study fiscal sustainability in the EU-15 countries by testing the
existence of co-integration between government expenditures and revenues, taken as a
percentage of GDP, and using the sequential procedure depicted in Figure 1. Visual
inspection of the time series for each country may give an early clue, as can be seen by
the examples in Figure 3, which depict government expenditures and revenues, as a
percentage of GDP, for Italy, Germany, France and the Netherlands. One suspects in
advance that Italy and France may not pass the sustainability tests.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
The first step is then to test the existence of a unit root for the government expenditures
and revenues as a percentage of GDP and to assess whether they are best characterised as
I(0) or as I(1) series. The results of those tests for the series in levels are presented in
Table 5.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
It is possible to conclude that almost all series are not stationary in levels. There are some
exceptions where the ADF test statistic does not allow rejecting the hypothesis that the
series are I (0). However, this never happened with the PP test statistic, and allowing for a
trend in the regressions, both the ADF and the PP tests report that all series are non-
stationary. For every country it is thus necessary to test for the stationarity of the first
differences of the series.
According to the results also reported in Table 5, in general one would not reject the
stationarity of the first differences of the government expenditures and revenues series.
This is true for all series according to the PP test, but less generalised under the ADF test
statistics results. One can then tentatively assume that the first difference of the original
series is I (0), which means that the series in levels are I (1). 14
The Engle-Granger and Johansen co-integration tests were subsequently performed with
the government revenues and expenditures as a percentage of GDP. Co-integration tests
were made for all countries, even for the countries where the ADF test statistic (but not
the PP test) allows rejecting the null of unit root for the first difference of the revenue and
expenditure series. The co-integration results are presented in Table 6, but only for the
cases where there is a co-integrating vector with at least a significance level of ten
percent.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
The test results allow the rejection of the co-integration hypothesis for the majority of the
countries, except for Austria, Germany, Finland, Netherlands, Portugal and the United
Kingdom. However, the estimated coefficients for expenditures, in the co-integration
equations, where government revenues are the dependent variable, are always less than
one. As a matter of fact, for each one percentage point of GDP increase in public
expenditures, for instance in the Netherlands and in Germany, public revenues only
increase respectively by 0.634 and 0.521 percentage points of GDP. Notice that these two
countries are the ones where the estimated coefficient b in the co-integrating vector (1, -
b) has the highest absolute value. For the other countries where a significant co-
integration vector was found, b is even lower in absolute value.
In other words, for the period 1970-2003, government expenditures in the
abovementioned countries exhibited a higher growth rate than public revenues,
challenging therefore the hypothesis of fiscal policy sustainability. These results suggest
that fiscal policy may not have been sustainable for most countries with the possible
exceptions of Germany and the Netherlands.
However, and as in the case of unit roots, a test for co-integration that does not take into
account possible breaks in the long-run relationship will have lower power. The test will
tend to under-reject the null of no co-integration if there is a co-integration relationship
that has changed at some time during the sample period. Therefore, to further evaluate the15
previous results, one should also entertain the possibility that the series are co-integrated
but that the linear combination has shifted at an unknown point in the data sample, in
other words, that there might be a relevant break date. Following Gregory and Hansen
(1996), the hypothesis of a structural shift in the co-integration relationships was then
studied.
16 Table 7 reports the results of the tests for regime shift (in level, with a time
trend) in co-integration of government revenues and expenditures for the EU-15
countries.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
It is possible to see that for the above-mentioned countries, where a co-integration vector
was found, the test statistics from Table 7 broadly support the previous findings. Indeed,
accounting for the existence of break dates, the null of no co-integration is now rejected
for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK, with the
ADF test statistic results (with the Phillips Z
* test statistic the null is only rejected for
Belgium). This means that there is some long-run relationship in the data for those
countries. Notice also that the null of no co-integration is no longer rejected for Germany.
Additionally, the fact that the null hypothesis is now rejected for Belgium implies that
structural changes in the co-integration vector may be important. Since for the remainder
of the countries both ADF and ADF
* test statistics reject the null of no co-integration, no
inference that structural change has occurred is warranted.
Our results, as most of the results reported in the literature were obtained without
considering additional sources of government revenues: for instance seigniorage and
privatisation revenues. Information on privatisation revenues is not easily available for
the EU-15 countries. Additionally, government assets (wealth) should be taken into
account to make judgements about the sustainability of public finances (even though data
are mostly lacking).
                                                          
16 A Gauss routine, from Gregory and Hensen, was used to perform the tests for co-integration with regime
shifts (see http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~bhansen/progs/joe_96.html). The authors have extended the Engle-
Granger model to allow for a single break in the co-integration relationship.16
5. Conclusion
The fiscal policy sustainability issue has been reviewed and discussed in this paper, using
the government budget constraint as the key element of the analysis, and also the starting
point to derive analytical formulations suitable for empirical testing. Formally, the PVBC
requires that all future net tax revenues (i.e. tax revenues less transfers of current and all
future generations measured in present value terms) are enough to cover the present value
of future government consumption and to service the existing stock of government debt
17. 
The paper’s results reveal that with few exceptions, EU governments might have
sustainability problems, although debt-to-GDP ratios showed signs of stabilising at the
end of the 1990s. Using government expenditures and revenues as a percentage of GDP,
a co-integration approach was adopted. However, and even if a co-integration vector
were identified for Austria, Germany, Finland, Netherlands and Portugal, the estimated
coefficients for expenditures in the co-integration equations for those countries, where
public revenues is the dependent variable, are less than one. 
The results of this paper are comparable with the ones from some of the existing cross-
country literature, and might be considered as “unpleasant” from a policy maker’s point
of view
18. A small number of countries emerge as less likely to exhibit sustainability
problems, namely Germany, Netherlands, Finland, Austria the UK. Of these, Germany
and the Netherlands almost always appear as less likely to have sustainability problems.
However, our results also show that even for those two countries, the absolute value of
the relevant estimated coefficient in the co-integration relation is quite below unity
implying that their budget deficits may not be sustainable.
Therefore, the aforementioned countries face the problem of having a higher growth rate
for expenditures than the growth rate of revenues.  In other words, if fiscal policy were to
be conducted in the future as it was in the past, there could still be some problems ahead,
                                                          
17 One should note that it does not assume that government debt is ever paid off.
18 See namely Vanhorebeek and van Rompuy (1995), Payne (1997), Artis and Marcelino (1998), Uctum
and Wickens (2000), and Bravo and Silvestre (2002).17
even for this set of countries that started, early in the 1990s, to make efforts in order to
meet strict budgetary criteria. This problem may even become more critical in the light of
some “unpleasant” available projections for the EU-15 countries, concerning future
public financial responsibilities. As a matter of fact, the EC (2001) reported that ageing
populations could lead to increased expenditure on public pensions by between 3 and 5
percentage points of GDP in most Member States, with larger increases in several
countries. Moreover, recent fiscal developments during 2001-2003 in several EU
countries do not seem reassuring in what terms of sustainability of public finances. 
It is nevertheless important to keep in mind that the main driver for budgetary problems
in developed countries during future decades will be population growth combined with
generous pay-as-you-go financed social security systems. Since this population shift
towards older societies is an entirely new phenomenon, it cannot be considered in
econometric results based exclusively on past data. This does not constitute a general
criticism against purely econometric methods of measuring fiscal sustainability, but is
instead an argument for expanding the database. Indeed, implicit public pension
liabilities, as part of a country’s global fiscal imbalance, have to be understood as future
borrowing requirements, not fully embedded in the public fiscal figures, leading therefore
to added sustainability problems
19. Also, one must recall that even for some of the
countries that are identified as not having had in the past an unsustainable policy, other
reports claim that sustainability may not be a feature of such countries’ fiscal policies
20. 
                                                          
19 For a review of this topic and some interesting data simulation see, for instance, EPC (2003), Rother et
al. (2003), and Holzmann et al. (2004).
20 See, for instance, Raffelhüschen (1999), and EC (1999, 2001).18
Annex: Data sources
All data was taken from the European Commission AMECO (Annual Macro-Economic
Data) database, updated on 07/01/2004. The relevant AMECO codes are reported below.
- General government public debt (national currency). Code: UDGGL (linked series). 
- Price deflator private of final consumption expenditure. Code: PCPH.
- General government total revenues, national currency. Code: URTG (ESA 1995);
URTGF (former definition).
- General government total expenditures, national currency. Code: UUTG (ESA 1995);
UUTGF (former definition).
- Gross domestic product, at market prices. Code: UVGDH (ESA 1995); UVGD (former
definition).
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Figure 1. Fiscal policy sustainability, unit root and co-integration tests
Unit root tests for R
and GG
R is I (0) and GG is I (1);
GG is I (1) and R is I (0)
There is no
sustainability
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R is I (1) and GG is I (1)
Co-integration tests
between R and GG

















b > 1 There is no
sustainability
                                                          
# Even if there is no co-integration, sustainability might not be a problem if, for instance, revenues are
higher than expenditures.24
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Figure 3. Government expenditures and revenues (percent of GDP)
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Table 1. Some existing empirical evidence regarding fiscal policy sustainability
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Austria Revenues 39.1 45.6 47.1 50.8 50.2 11.2
Expenditures 37.9 47.2 49.6 52.6 51.2 13.3
Belgium Revenues 38.7 47.6 47.5 49.5 51.4 12.7
Expenditures 40.8 56.1 52.9 49.3 51.1 10.3
Denmark Revenues 44.8 49.9 55.1 57.2 56.4 11.6
Expenditures 40.8 53.1 56.1 54.6 55.4 14.6
Finland Revenues 34.1 42.0 51.3 56.1 53.4 19.3
Expenditures 29.9 38.7 46.0 49.0 50.9 21.0
France Revenues 37.9 45.3 48.2 51.3 50.5 12.6
Expenditures 37.1 45.4 49.7 52.7 54.7 17.6
Germany Revenues 38.0 44.3 42.1 47.1 44.9 6.9
Expenditures 37.7 47.1 44.1 48.2 49.1 11.4
Greece Revenues 24.7 26.3 32.5 47.8 44.6 19.9
Expenditures 24.2 29.0 48.4 49.8 46.3 22.1
Ireland Revenues 30.3 34.5 35.9 36.5 34.0 3.6
Expenditures 34.2 46.1 38.0 32.1 34.8 0.6
Italy Revenues 29.0 34.4 42.8 46.2 45.9 16.9
Expenditures 32.6 43.0 53.8 48.1 48.5 15.9
Luxembourg Revenues 31.7 48.0 44.9 47.5 15.7
Expenditures 28.9 48.4 38.5 48.2 19.3
Netherlands Revenues 38.9 50.6 48.0 47.5 45.9 7.0
Expenditures 40.1 54.7 53.0 46.0 48.5 8.4
Portugal Revenues 22.5 27.8 33.9 42.3 44.2 21.7
Expenditures 19.7 36.2 38.8 45.4 47.1 27.4
Spain Revenues 21.3 29.0 38.4 39.0 39.8 18.5
Expenditures 20.7 31.5 42.6 39.9 39.8 19.1
Sweden Revenues 46.3 56.1 62.6 60.9 59.2 12.8
Expenditures 42.1 60.0 58.5 57.4 59.0 16.9
UK Revenues 39.9 39.8 38.3 40.8 40.0 0.2
Expenditures 36.9 43.2 39.2 39.3 42.8 5.9
Notes: pp - percentage points. UMTS revenues are excluded from the numbers.
Source: European Commission, AMECO database (updated on 07/01/2004).29
Table 3. Stationarity tests for the first difference of the stock of public debt, with constant,
no trend (at 1995 prices)
ADF PP





Austria 1970-2003 3 -4.00 *** 0.00 -16.15 0.03
Belgium 1970-2003 5 -1.08 0.72 -4.05 0.53
Denmark 1971-2003 2 -2.26 0.19 -9.97 0.14
Finland 1970-2003 3 -2.41 0.14 -10.34 0.12
France 1977-2003 2 -2.50 0.12 -11.44 * 0.10
Germany 1970-2003 2 -2.50 0.13 -17.48 ** 0.02
Greece 1970-2003 2 -2.38 0.15 -26.89 *** 0.00
Ireland 1970-2003 5 -0.91 0.78 -18.35 ** 0.02
Italy 1970-2003 2 -1.20 0.67 -6.53 0.31
Luxembourg 1970-2003 2 -1.86 0.35 -13.45 * 0.06
Netherlands 1975-2003 2 -1.21 0.67 -7.71 0.24
Portugal 1973-2003 2 -3.77 *** 0.00 -29.11 *** 0.00
Spain 1970-2003 5 -2.02 0.28 -14.44 ** 0.05
Sweden 1970-2003 2 -2.50 0.12 -13.93 ** 0.05
United Kingdom 1970-2003 5 -3.13 * 0.10 -9.05 0.50
Note: The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.30
Table 4. Test for structural change in general government debt,
(innovational outlier model)










Austria 1970-2003 1992 -5.04 ** 1 1991 -3.71  2
Belgium 1970-2003 1991 -3.81  1 1988 -3.13  1
Denmark 1971-2003 1993 -3.50  2 1989 -3.63  2
Finland 1970-2003 1991 -8.18 *** 1 1990 -9.84 *** 0
France 1977-2003 1988 -3.88  2 1988 -3.72  2
Germany 1970-2003 1994 -3.28  0 1993 -4.25 ** 0
Greece 1970-2003 1978 -2.66  0 1991 -1.97  0
Ireland 1970-2003 1985 -4.00  0 1984 -3.85  0
Italy 1970-2003 1991 -2.39  1 1990 -2.33  1
Luxembourg 1970-2003 1986 -3.37  1 2000 -1.53 1
Netherlands 1975-2003 1991 -3.17  0 1986 -2.59  0
Portugal 1973-2003 1984 -4.34  0 1991 -3.78  1
Spain 1970-2003 1992 -2.87  0 1991 -2.80  0
Sweden 1970-2003 1997 -3.87  2 1999 -4.56 *** 2
United Kingdom 1970-2003 1987 -6.09 *** 2 1986 -6.30 *** 2
Note: The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively,
using the critical values from Zivot and Andrews (1992, table 4) 31
Table 5.  Stationary of government revenues and expenditures (percent of GDP), with constant, no trend
Original series First difference of the original series










Austria R 2 -1.87 0.35 -2.42 0.73 3 -2.64* 0.09 -32.05*** 0.00
GG 2 -2.78* 0.06 -3.39 0.61 2 -2.19 0.21 -31.78*** 0.00
Belgium R 2 -3.19** 0.02 -3.77 0.56 2 -2.10 0.25 -28.36*** 0.00
GG 4 -3.31** 0.02 -5.33 0.40 2 -2.13 0.23 -19.53** 0.01
Denmark R 2 -1.46 0.55 -1.77 0.81 2 -2.86** 0.05 -29.00*** 0.00
GG 3 -3.24** 0.02 -3.23 0.63 2 -2.62* 0.09 -19.50** 0.01
Finland R 5 -1.07 0.73 -2.21 0.76 5 -3.31** 0.01 -17.72** 0.02
GG 3 -1.99 0.29 -2.98 0.66 3 -2.42 0.14 -15.24** 0.04
France R 2 -2.30 0.17 -1.96 0.78 2 -2.45 0.13 -19.17** 0.01
GG 3 -2.56 0.11 -2.19 0.76 5 -2.03 0.27 -17.65** 0.02
Germany R 2 -3.16** 0.02 -6.18 0.33 2 -2.67* 0.08 -29.82*** 0.00
GG 2 -3.06** 0.03 -6.49 0.31 2 -2.69* 0.08 -20.25** 0.01
Greece R 2 -0.41 0.91 0.05 0.96 2 -2.77* 0.06 -27.70*** 0.00
GG 3 -2.35 0.16 -1.40 0.85 2 -2.81* 0.06 -38.15*** 0.00
Ireland R 2 -2.17 0.22 -5.41 0.40 2 -2.92** 0.04 -36.25*** 0.00
GG 3 -1.60 0.48 -4.32 0.50 2 -3.24** 0.02 -22.34** 0.01
Italy R 3 -1.65 0.46 -1.02 0.88 2 -3.20** 0.02 -36.20*** 0.00
GG 5 -1.64 0.46 -3.41 0.61 4 -1.75 0.41 -36.47*** 0.00
Netherlands R 2 -2.25 0.19 -5.72 0.37 2 -2.34 0.16 -24.25*** 0.00
GG 3 -2.68* 0.08 -4.55 0.48 2 -1.80 0.38 -14.55** 0.05
Portugal R 4 -1.07 0.73 -0.09 0.95 3 -3.89** 0.00 -20.48** 0.01
GG 2 -2.12 0.24 -2.63 0.70 2 -2.95** 0.04 -23.88*** 0.00
Spain R 2 -1.86 0.35 -1.23 0.86 3 -1.63 0.50 -32.58*** 0.00
GG 3 -2.56* 0.10 -2.19 0.76 3 -1.47 0.55 -17.32** 0.02
Sweden R 5 -3.45*** 0.01 -4.17 0.52 5 -2.17 0.22 -19.82** 0.01
GG 5 -3.37*** 0.01 -4.80 0.45 2 -1.94 0.31 -21.99** 0.01
United Kingdom R 3 -2.11 0.24 -9.33 0.16 3 -3.26** 0.02 -17.88** 0.02
GG 3 -3.87*** 0.00 -10.10 -0.14 2 -2.57* 0.10 -15.65** 0.03
Notes: The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Unit root tests were not carried out for Luxembourg since
there were no data available in the AMECO database between 1988 and 1994. Some consistency in the asterisk signals for the significance levels may be lost due to
rounding.32







Vector P-valueAsy Vector P-valueAsy
R [1  -0.380]*** 0.008 [1  -0.418]** 0.035 Austria
GG [1  -1.609]* 0.084 [1  -2.395]**
R [1  -0.521]** 0.020 [1  -0.629]** 0.017 Germany
GG [1  -1.272]** 0.018 [1  -1.589]**
R [1  -0.343]** 0.022 [1  -0.368]* 0.070 Finland
GG - - [1  -2.719]*
R [1  -0.634]** 0.037 [1  -0.665]** 0.016 Netherlands
GG [1  -1.455]* 0.100 [1  -1.505]**
R [1  -0.205]*** 0.004 [1  -0.174]*** 0.009 Portugal
GG - - [1  -5.740]***
R - - - United
Kingdom GG [1 –0.516]** 0.044 [1  -0.735]** 0.017
Notes: The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level
respectively. Only co-integrating vectors with at least a 10% significance level are reported.33
Table 7. Testing for regime shifts in co-integration of government revenues and
expenditures (percent of GDP), level shift with time trend 













Austria -5.47 ** (0.79) 1997 -28.65  (0.76) 1996
Belgium -4.86 * (0.82) 1998 -80.20 *** (0.53) 1996
Denmark -5.14 ** (0.41) 1984 -24.41 (0.41) 1984
Finland -4.58 ** (0.21) 1977 -20.89  (0.15) 1975
France -3.71 (0.62) 1991 -21.95 (0.62) 1991
Germany -3.98 (0.18) 1976 -26.37 (0.56) 1989
Greece -4.45 (0.76) 1996 -25.46 (0.76) 1996
Ireland -3.32 (0.38) 1983 -20.73 (0.35) 1982
Italy -3.73 (0.59) 1990 -19.26 (0.59) 1990
Netherlands -4.75 * (0.15) 1975 -25.06 (0.15) 1975
Portugal -5.59 *** (0.15) 1975 -27.56 (0.15) 1975
Spain -4.23 (0.47) 1986 -24.96 (0.71) 1994
Sweden -4.41 (0.65) 1992 -21.44 (0.65) 1992
United Kingdom -4.75 * (0.53) 1988 -21.05 (0.53) 1988
Notes: ADF
* and Z
* refer to the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and to the Phillips Z
* test statistics.
The symbols *, **, and *** denote statistical significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively, using
the critical values from Gregory and Hansen (1996, table 1).